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AIRLINE LIABILITY-THE WARSAW CONVENTION-
FIFTH CIRCUIT RULES THAT HOLDING A PASSENGER'S
BAGGAGE FOR RANSOM IS NOT ACTIONABLE
UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION:
MBABA V. SOCIETE AIR FRANCE
STEVE MANN*
T HE WARSAW CONVENTION governs the liability of air-
lines and the potential passengers' remedies for damages in-
curred in the course of international air travel,1 with a purpose
to establish a uniform set of legal rules "governing claims arising
from international air transportation. '2 In order to satisfy this
goal, the Convention attempts to shield international air carriers
from the decidedly non-uniform liability rules of individual na-
tions by preempting these local laws and substituting itself as the
sole source of remedies for injured passengers.3 For passengers,
the effect of this preemption is to provide them with a restricted
set of claims they can pursue against an air carrier and to limit
the carrier's liability under those claims, in exchange for near-
absolute liability of the carrier on claims that fall within the Con-
vention.4 The Convention's limitation on available claims has
the effect of providing air carriers a nearly impenetrable de-
fense, as the Supreme Court has held that injuries falling within
the scope of the Convention, but not specifically actionable
under the Convention, are not actionable at all.5 The Fifth Cir-
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2008.
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105 (West 1997) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
2 Mbaba v. Societe Air Fr., 457 F.3d 496, 497 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting El Al Isr.
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 169 (1999)).
3 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, International Air Cargo & Baggage Liability and the
Tower of Babel, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. Rv. 239, 245-47 (2004).
4 Id. at 247.
5 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161.
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cuit recently relied on this holding to prevent a passenger from
bringing breach of contract and deceptive trade practice claims
against an air carrier.6 Unfortunately, the court failed to con-
sider whether the passenger's injuries actually occurred within
the scope of the Convention, and assumed without specifically
deciding that the Convention was applicable.7 Consequently,
the court erroneously found that the Convention's preemptive
effect precluded all of the passenger's claims.8
Edo Mbaba (Mbaba) purchased a ticket on Air France for
travel from Houston, Texas to Lagos, Nigeria, leaving on June
15, 2002 with a layover in Paris, France. 9 Upon checking in for
his flight, Air France charged him $520.00 in excess baggage
fees and issued a baggage ticket indicating the bags would be
transported from Houston to Lagos. 10 When Mbaba arrived in
Paris, the airline unloaded his bags, causing him to miss his con-
nection.1' He reclaimed his bags, and the next morning when
he checked in for his new connecting flight to Lagos, Air France
charged him an additional $4048.66 in excess baggage fees for
these same bags, due to a different method of calculating excess
baggage fees in Paris.1 2 Mbaba alleged that Air France refused
to send his bags back to Houston, and informed him that if he
did not pay the fee his bags would be "taken out and burned."'3
Mbaba filed "suit against Air France in Texas state court, alleg-
ing breach of contract, violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, and common law fraud."' 4 Air France removed
the case to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas and promptly moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the Warsaw Convention preempted all of Mbaba's
state law claims. 5 The district court granted Air France's mo-
tion, and Mbaba appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. 16
On appeal, Mbaba argued that his claims were not preempted
because his injuries are not included in the language of the
6 Mbaba, 457 F.3d at 496-97.
7 See id.
8 See id.










Convention-specifically language in Article 24 stating that
claims "can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits
set out in this Convention."' 7 To support this proposition, he
relied on a discussion in Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., where
the Supreme Court addressed a hypothetical offered by the Sec-
ond Circuit.' 8 The Second Circuit feared that construing the
Convention to be the sole source of relief available to passengers
would give rise to situations not desired by the drafters, such as a
lack of recourse against an airline when a passenger suffers an
injury on an escalator in the airport terminal. " In response to
this hypothetical, the Supreme Court stated that "[t] he Conven-
tion's preemptive effect on local law extends no further than the
Convention's own substantive scope."2 Mbaba asked the Fifth
Circuit to interpret "scope" in Tseng to mean the type of claims
contemplated by the Convention.2' The Fifth Circuit rejected
Mbaba's arguments and affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment.2 2 This holding relied on the court's deter-
mination that. allowing the claims would defeat the Conven-
tion's goal of uniformity, based on the text of the Convention
and the Supreme Court's opinion in Tseng.23
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that paragraph one of Article 24 of
the Convention, as amended by Montreal Protocol No. 4, states
that "[i] n the carriage of passengers and baggage, any action for
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the
conditions and limits set out in this Convention. 24 While not
directly applicable under the facts at hand, the Fifth Circuit also
looked to paragraph two of Article 24, which in pertinent part
reads, "[i] n the carriage of cargo, any action for damages, how-
ever founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or
in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the condi-
tions and limits of liability set out in this Convention. ' 21 The
court placed great emphasis on the phrase "however founded"
contained in both of these paragraphs, stating that this phrase
in paragraph one of Article 24 "specifically preempts claims re-
17 Id. at 499 (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 24).
is Id. (citing El A] Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 171-72 (1999)).
19' SeeTseng v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd,
525 U.S. 155 (1999).
20 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 172.
21 Mbaba, 457 F.3d at 500 n.1.
22 Id. at 500-01.
23 Id. at 500.
24 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 24; Mbaba, 457 F.3d at 497-98.
25 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 24; Mbaba, 457 F.3d at 498.
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sulting from the carriage of baggage. 2" In interpreting this lan-
guage, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
analysis of the pre-Montreal Protocol No. 4 Article 24 language
in Tseng.27 The Montreal Protocol No. 4 language made an ap-
parent scope change to Article 24 by substituting "[i] n the car-
riage of passengers and baggage" for the previous language of
"[i]n the cases covered by articles 18 and 19," among other
changes.2' The court concluded that this was not a substantive
change, and that it merely clarified the earlier language2 9 -thus
allowing the Fifth Circuit to rely upon the holding in interpreta-
tion of the modified language. The Court ultimately held that
the "Convention precludes a passenger from maintaining an ac-
tion . ..under local law when her claim does not satisfy the
conditions for liability under the Convention." ' ° The Fifth Cir-
cuit found that this holding was dispositive of the present case.
In addition to the Convention's plain language and the hold-
ing in Tseng, the court found support in a Second Circuit case,
where that circuit-also applying Tseng-found that the Con-
vention's preemptive effect extended to all causes of action, re-
gardless of whether a particular claim could actually be
maintained under the provisions of the Convention. 2 Finally,
the Fifth Circuit supported its holding on the policy ground that
the Convention's ultimate goal was to provide uniformity of
rules for international travel, and allowing Mbaba to pursue his
claims would violate this underlying precept.3 -
The Fifth Circuit erroneously affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to Air France. The court should
review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 4 In
affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment, the
Fifth Circuit evaluated the Convention's language and support-
ing precedents in isolation, ignoring the elements of those hold-
26 Mbaba, 457 F.3d at 500.
27 Id. at 499-500.
28 El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 174-75 (1999); Mbaba, 457
F.3d at 500 n.2.
29 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 175.
30 Id. at 176.
31 Mbaba, 457 F.3d at 500.
32 Id. (quoting King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 357-58 (2d Cir. 2002)).
33 Id. (citing Tseng, 525 U.S. at 169).
34 See id. at 497 (citing Am. Home Assurance Co. v. United Space Alliance, 378
F.3d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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ings that define the outer scope of the Convention's
applicability and preemption.
The Fifth Circuit evaluated paragraph one of Article 24 of the
amended Convention and concluded that the text specifically
preempts all claims related to the carriage of baggage, relying
on the phrase "however founded" to support the conclusion
that the preemption was expansive.15 The court failed to evalu-
ate that language within the broader scope of the Convention
itself. In Tseng, the Supreme Court stated that "the Conven-
tion's preemptive effect on local law extends no further than the
Convention's own substantive scope." 6 Mbaba asked the court
to interpret "scope" to pertain to the types of claims contem-
plated by the Convention, but the court chose to interpret
"scope" to describe the actual boundaries of the Convention it-
self-that the injury must occur on board the airplane or in the
process of embarking or disembarking. 7 The court's analysis,
then, leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Convention's
preemptive effect on local law does not extend beyond injuries
that are incurred on board the aircraft or during the process of
embarking or disembarking-a statement that was made by the
Supreme Court in Tseng and quoted by the Fifth Circuit in its
decision in the present case." This overriding statement of
scope serves as a qualification to the "however founded" lan-
guage relied upon by the Fifth Circuit to show preemption of
Mbaba's claims. 9 The Fifth Circuit ignores this scope statement
and concludes that the plain language of Article 24 makes it
clear that all causes of action in the carriage of baggage are pre-
empted by the Convention. 40  The court never considers
whether Mbaba's injuries fall within the overriding scope of the
Convention described by the Supreme Court in Tseng Did the
injuries occur on board the aircraft, during the process of em-
barking or disembarking, or at some other time? The court sim-
ply ignores this fundamental question.4'
In the Fifth Circuit's discussion of "scope" as the term was de-
fined by the Supreme Court in Tseng, it cites the First Circuit
35 Id. at 500.
36 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 172.
37 Mbaba, 457 F.3d at 500 n.1.
38 Id. at 499-500 (quoting Tseng, 525 U.S. at 172).
.19 See id. at 500.
40 See id.
41 See id.
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decision in Acevedo-Reinoso v. Iberia Lineas A~reas de Espafia S.A.42
to support the conclusion that "scope" refers to the Conven-
tion's limit of applicability to injuries that occur in the air or
during the process of embarking or disembarking.43 In Acevedo-
Reinoso, the plaintiff was a citizen of Cuba, residing in the
United States but carrying a Cuban passport and traveling from
Puerto Rico to Spain.44 The Iberia agent informed the plaintiff
that all immigration documents were properly in place and al-
lowed him to board the plane, but upon arrival in Spain the
plaintiff was immediately detained by Spanish authorities be-
cause he held a Cuban passport.4 5 After threats of deportation
to Cuba and other humiliating experiences, the plaintiff was
sent back to Puerto Rico where he filed suit against the airline in
federal court, alleging the non-Convention claim of negli-
gence.46 The district court granted Iberia's motion to dismiss,
but this ruling was vacated by the First Circuit, which held that
the district court "erroneously conflated the applicability of the
Convention with liability under the Convention."" The same
mistake was made by the Fifth Circuit in its analysis of Air
France's motion for summary judgment.
Much like the Fifth Circuit in the present case, the district
court in Acevedo-Reinoso relied on Tseng to support the proposi-
tion that that plaintiffs only basis for recovery is the Conven-
tion.4" The First Circuit distinguished Tseng, however, stating
that it did not support such an assumption because in Tseng, the
applicability of the Convention was not at issue, as the parties
stipulated that the injuries occurred in the course of embarking
during international travel.49 The parties made no such stipula-
tion in Acevedo-Reinoso, nor does the record show any stipulation
by Mbaba. The First Circuit properly vacated the district court's
decision and remanded the case for determination of whether
the plaintiffs injuries occurred "in the course of any of the op-
erations of embarking or disembarking. '50 The Fifth Circuit
42 449 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2006).
43 Mbaba, 457 F.3d at 500 n.1 (citing Acevedo-Reinoso, 449 F.3d at 14).
44 Acevedo-Reinoso, 449 F.3d at 9.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 10.
47 Id. at 13-14.
48 Id. at 13.
49 Id. (citing El A] Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167 (1999)).
-o Id. at 16.
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cites Acevedo-Reinoso in support of its definition of "scope," but
then ignores the implications of this definition.
The Fifth Circuit drew additional support from the Second
Circuit's decision in King v. American Airlines, Inc.5" In King, the
plaintiffs held confirmed tickets on a flight but were "bumped"
after having boarded the vehicle that transported passengers
from the terminal to the aircraft.52 The plaintiffs alleged that
they had been discriminated against due to their race, and
brought suit under various federal and state laws.5 3 The Second
Circuit, also relying on Tseng, held that the Convention pre-
empted all local law causes of action, regardless of whether the
Convention offered a remedy.54 This case is factually distin-
guishable from the present case, however. While both cases in-
volved plaintiffs bringing claims that are not specifically
available under the Convention, the plaintiffs in King had begun
the process of embarking. They had left the terminal itself and
were under the control of the airline, in a restricted area, on the
airline vehicle that transported passengers to the actual air-
craft55-a situation that is analogous to a passenger walking
down thejetbridge to the aircraft. Conversely, Mbaba was in the
airport terminal, had reclaimed his bags, and had spent the pre-
vious night sleeping in the airport out of the airline's control. 6
King did not present an issue as to the broad scope of the Con-
vention, but rather one of individual causes of action relating to
an injury that was within the Convention's scope.
Finally, in light of the court's failure to consider the threshold
question of whether the Convention itself was applicable to the
dispute at all, its policy argument that allowing Mbaba's claims
would undermine the Convention's goal of uniformity is not
convincing. The Convention's goal is to provide uniformity of
legal rules within the boundaries of applicability established by
the drafters-those boundaries state that the Convention ap-
plies to physical injuries suffered on board the aircraft or during
the process of embarking or disembarking.57 Outside of this
51 Mbaba v. Societe Air Fr., 457 F.3d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing King v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 357-58 (2d Cir. 2002)).
52 King, 284 F.3d at 355.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 357.
55 Id. at 355.
56 Mbaba, 457 F.3d at 497.
57 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17; El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v.
Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 161 (1999).
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scope, the Convention no longer applies, and the goal of inter-
national uniformity is inapplicable. Since the court ignored the
fundamental question of whether Mbaba's injuries were suf-
fered within the defined scope of the Convention, the court's
concern for international uniformity of law is unfounded.
The Fifth Circuit ignored the gating requirement for applica-
bility of the Warsaw Convention. In doing so, the court has cre-
ated uncertainty as to the breadth of claims that may be
preempted by the Convention, and has potentially broadened
that preemption to include passenger claims for fundamental
services. Under the court's analysis, a passenger who purchased
a $520 ticket for travel from Houston to Lagos, connecting
through Paris, and when in Paris, was charged an additional
$4,000 to complete the trip, would have no recourse against the
airline because the Convention offers no cause of action for this
injury. Taken to its logical conclusion, this holding makes air-
lines essentially immune from deceptive trade practices actions
brought by traveling passengers, since the Convention itself pro-
vides no remedy for these injuries. The Convention's drafters
desired uniformity of legal rules, not immunity from them. By
ignoring the scope of the Convention's applicability, the Fifth
Circuit has come dangerously close to giving both.
408
